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POLICY LIMITATIONS
UPON RESTRICTIONS ON LAND USE
By RICHARD H. BRYAN*
IN REVIEWING the judicial attitude of the California courts on the
restrictions on the use of land, we see a public policy evolving limiting
the enforceability of the restrictions imposed. At present, the policy has
assumed form and crystallized in four general areas. First, the courts
will not enforce conditions and restrictions upon the use of land de-
signed to create a monopoly in favor of the grantor nor will they sus-
tain restrictions placing control over a governmental function in the
hands of a private citizen. Secondly, in applying the doctrine of chang-
ing conditions, the courts have tended to extend a liberal interpretation
in finding that the change sought to be established is in fact present
and refused to enjoin the alleged violation. Thirdly, where the party
seeking to enforce the restriction is derelict in the exercise of the right
to enforce the breach or by his conduct indicates an abandonment of
the intent to enforce he may be estopped to enforce that restriction.
Fourthly, the courts have extended the judicial bias of strict construc-
tion against restrictions imposed in favor of the grantor and have laid
down rigid requirements in creating restrictions by way of servitude
or running covenant.'
In general the California courts have held the right to annex re-
striction to a conveyance is a necessary incident to the right to own
and convey property.2 Thus, the courts have upheld restrictions re-
quiring part of the property to be applied to a particular use.3 Like-
wise, they have sustained restrictions prohibiting a particular activity-
as for example, a slaughterhouse,4 an oil well, '  or the use of firearms.,
Member, Second Year class.
Werner v. Graham, 181 Cal. 174, 183 Pac. 945 (1919); King v. Snyder, 189 Cal.
App. 2d 482, 11 Cal. Rptr. 328 (1961); Chandler v. Smith, 170 Cal. App. 2d 118, 338
P.2d 522 (1959); Kent v. Koch, 166 Cal. App. 2d 579, 333 P.2d 411 (1958); Weston v.
Foreman, 108 Cal. App. 2d 686, 239 P.2d 513 (1952).
2 Cornbleth v. Allen, 80 Cal. App. 459, 251 Pac. 87 ( 1926); Los Angeles & Salt Lake
R.R. v. United States, 140 F.2d 436 (1944) and cases cited at 438.
3 Rosecrans v. Pacific Elec. Ry., 21 Cal. 2d 602, 134 P.2d 245 (1943) (for a rail-
road); Papst v. Hamilton, 133 Cal. 631, 66 Pac. 10 (1901) (for a school); Mitchell v.
Cheney Slough Irrigation Co., 57 Cal. App. 2d 138, 134 P.2d 34 (1943) (for constmc-
tion and maintenance of pumping plant).
4 Los Angeles Terminal Land Co. v. Muir, 136 Cal. 36, 68 Pac. 308 (1902).
5 Miles v. Clark, 44 Cal. App. 539, 187 Pac. 167 (1920).
6 Guaranty Realty Co. v. Recreation Gun Club, 12 Cal, App. 383, 107 Pac. 625
(1910).
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Covenants and conditions restricting the use of property conveyed
for residential purposes; and, building restrictions imposed on the lots
conveyed restricting the use of the property to private dwellings are
also generally regarded as enforceable7
To what extent has a public policy been evolved by the California
courts favoring the free and unrestricted use of land over the grantor's
right to place unlimited restrictions on the use of conveyed land?
Monopoly Interference With Government Function
Where the grantor's purpose in attaching conditions or covenants
restricting the use of land is to create a monopoly in his favor, the
courts have without hesitation held such conditions void as against
public policy.8
In dealing with conveyances from private citizens to municipal-
ities, the courts have been quick to strike out as void use-restrictions
which would enable the private citizen to sit in judgment of the ac-
tions of the city. In the leading case of Wills v. City of Los Angeles,9
land was conveyed to the city for the purpose of a street containing
the conditions that the same could never be used as a street railway
and reserving a right of entry for its breach. In deciding the condition
was void, the court went on to say that control of municipal streets is
purely a governmental process and a private person may not sit in
judgment.
Changed Conditions
Underlying the doctrine of changed conditions, is the principle
that a court of equity will not enforce a restriction on property when
the original purpose of the conveyor cannot be effected, thus making
enforcement unjust or inequitable.
An excellent illustration of this principle and the factors on which
the California courts rely is afforded in a series of cases which were
litigated in the California courts between 1917 and 1931 involving the
same piece of land and the same restrictions.
In the initial action 10 to quiet title, plaintiffs sought to have restric-
tions limiting the use of their property to single family residences de-
clared no longer enforceable as applied to them. Judgment for the
plaintiff was reversed by the appellate court on the grounds that the
action was commenced prematurely as no breach had occurred nor
7 Hannula v. Hacienda Homes, 34 Cal. 2d 442, 211 P.2d 302, 19 A.L.R.2d 1268
(1949); Weston v. Foreman, 108 Cal. App. 2d 626, 239 P.2d 513, 19 A.L.R.2d 1274
(1952).
8 Burdell v. Grandi, 152 Cal. 376, 92 Pac. 1022 (1907) (attempt to monopolize
liquor sales).
p209 Cal. 448, 287 Pac. 962, 69 A.L.R. 1044 (1930).
10 Strong v. Shatto, 45 Cal. App. 29, 187 Pac. 159 (1919).
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was one threatened, 1 and the fact that the property had become
desirable for business purposes would not defeat the application of
equitable relief where the restriction was still of substantial benefit
to the grantor.
Thus the court laid down a test of substantial value to the grantor
as the principle criterion in enforcing the restriction.
Eight years later, the same issue was before the California Supreme
Court.1 2 This time plaintiff relied on a change in zoning and the fact
that other lots in the subdivision had restrictions on use which were
limited in duration while the restrictions in question were unlimited in
duration. Plaintiff introduced further evidence to show that the char-
acter of the surrounding area had undergone a substantial change in
that an increase in vehicular traffic was evident. In denying relief from
the restriction the court dismissed as immaterial the changes within
the subdivision and held that the changes outside the subdivision were
changes in degree only and not of kind. The majority opinion went on
to say that where a change of conditions was relied upon to obtain
relief from enforcement, the change must be complete. The concurring
majority opinion, however, indicated that the court had overstated its
position on the amount of change necessary in the surrounding area to
deny enforcement.
In Hurd v. Albert,'3 the California Supreme Court reversed its
holding in Strong v. Hancock'4 decided five years earlier, on the basis
that in the case at bar the trial court had found the property unsuited
for residential living whereas in Hancock the trial court had found
only that the land in question was more desirable for business purposes
but that the original purpose could still be effected. In Hurd, the
Supreme Court in holding that the evidence supported the verdict of
the trial court, held that evidence as to change of conditions could be
adduced from changes within or outside the tract, thereby expanding
the criterion laid down in the leading case of Downs v. Kroger."
This liberal construction of what constitutes a change of condi-
tions was further extended in the recent decision by a divided court
in Wolff v. Fallon. 6 In this case, an injunction to enjoin the land
holder who was about to breach a covenant in the deed restricting the
use of the land to certain residential uses was denied where the lot
burdened with the restrictions was found no longer desirable or suit-
able for residential purposes and its use for business would not detri-
mentally affect adjoining property holders and might be beneficial.
11 Declaratory judgment legislation adopted subsequent to this decision would now
eliminate this objection. See CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1060.
12 Strong v. Hancock, 201 Cal. 530, 258 Pac. 65 (1927).
13 214 Cal. 15, 3 P.2d 545, 76 A.L.R.2d 1348 (1931).
14 201 Cal. 530, 258 Pac. 65 (1927).
15 200 Cal. 743, 254 Pac. 1101 (1927).
1644 Cal. 2d 695, 284 P.2d 802 (1955).
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The majority opinion placed great emphasis on the disparity of value
of the property to the owner as a residential site and as a business site.
In the dissenting opinion, language found in Marra v. Aetna Constr.17
was relied upon, indicating that before a change of condition could
be found to avoid enforcement of conditions, the conditions or re-
strictions sought to be enforced must be obsolete. Although this state-
ment is found in the opinion, the court held that such an obsolescence
was present and other language in the case indicates that the court
probably meant no more than that the original purpose of the condi-
tions could be no longer fulfilled.
It is interesting to note that in both Wolff and Marra the court, in
reaching its conclusion that a change of conditions in fact had made
it inequitable and unjust to enforce the restrictions, relied on the differ-
ence in value to the owner with the restrictions and without them. In
both cases the value of the property to the owner 'was substantially
greater without restrictions.'
The development of the doctrine of changed conditions indicates
an increasingly liberal attitude of the court in holding that the changed
conditions do exist. The change may be either inside or outside the
tract, and a decision enforcing the restrictions on the use of land is
not res judicata' 9 and may in the future be denied enforcement if
additional evidence of change can be shown. Further, it would seem
that the courts in determining whether the change exists, are taking
cognizance of the value of the property to the owner with and without
the restrictions and, when the disparity is great, this is a significant
factor in determining whether the enforcement should be denied.
Waiver and Laches
Once a breach has occurred the party for whose benefit the re-
striction was reserved may lose the right to enforce the limitation upon
the use of the land. This rule is based on the fundamental principle
that when in the general course of dealing between the parties one of
them is led to believe strict compliance with the conditions will not
be required the party in whose favor the limitation is created may be
estopped to assert that right.20
The grantor has reasonable time after a breach to declare a for-
feiture and if he fails to do so within that time his power to do so
expires.2 ' Thus where land was originally intended to be set aside for
17 15 Cal. 2d 375, 101 P.2d 490 (1940).
18 Approving the loss of money profit to the owner as an important factor in setting
aside the restrictions of the deed see Hirsch v. Hancock, 173 Cal. App. 2d 745, 343 P.2d
959 (1959) (where the value to the land holder with restrictions forbidding the use of
the property for drilling purposes was $250 to $400 a foot as opposed to $1,000 to $1,200
without the restriction).
19 Hurd v. Albert, 214 Cal. 15, 3 P.2d 545, 76 A.L.R.2d 1348 (1931).
20 See generally, CAL. Jur. 2d Covenants §§ 120, 125 (1954).
21 City of Santa Monica v. Jones, 104 Cal. App. 2d 463, 232 P.2d 55 (1951).
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a model prohibition city and lots were conveyed pursuant to this gen-
eral scheme containing restrictions on the sale of liquor, but subse-
quently the project was abandoned and other lots in the development
were sold without liquor restrictions, the restriction was waived. 22
Lapse of time, however, need not be the controlling factor. Where
one sold a lot subject to restriction for residential purposes and plans
for construction of a building for business purposes were approved
by the grantor and the grantor watched the building being constructed
without notice of intention to enforce, the grantor thereafter was
estopped to assert the condition. 23
The right to enforce restrictions may also be lost by laches. Here
the party subject to the restrictions must show he has been unduly
prejudiced and has suffered financial loss as a result of the grantor's
continued acquiescence. Mere lapse of time is not sufficient.24
The Doctrine of Strict Construction
In determining whether the conduct involved constitutes a breach
of the restrictive covenants, the California courts are aided by statutory
authority providing that a restriction is construed against the party
for whose benefit it was created,25 often the grantor. Thus it has been
held that a restriction upon the use of land "for residence purpose only
and in no wise for business purposes" did not prevent the land holder
from constructing multiple dwelling apartments. 26
In general, the courts have adopted the common law rules of con-
struction and have extended the judicial bias against restrictions pro-
viding forfeiture. Restrictive covenants are to be strictly construed
and will not be extended by implication.27 Whenever possible, a condi-
tion will be construed as a covenant .2' Terms of the forfeiture will
also be strictly construed. 2 '9
Thus independent of legislation, the California courts have evinced
a strong inclination to deny enforcement of restrictions and conditions
limiting the use of land when the original intent of the grantor can no
-"Wedum-Aldahl Co. v. Miller, 18 Cal. App. 2d 745, 64 P.2d 762 (1937).
23 Fontana Farms Co. v. Criss, 77 Cal. App. 2d 190, 174 P.2d 890 (1946).
24 On waiver and estoppel generally, see 4 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY §§ 547
(1924); TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920).
25 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1442.
21 Weber v. Graner, 137 Cal. App. 2d 771, 291 P.2d 173 (1955).
27 Ibid.; Bramwell v. Kuhle, 183 Cal. App. 2d 767, 6 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1960).
28 Alamo School Dist. v. Jones, 182 Cal. App. 2d 180, 6 Cal. Rptr. 272 (1960);
People v. Los Angeles, 179 Cal. App. 2d 558, 4 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1960).
29 Savanna School Dist. v. McCleod, 137 Cal. App. 2d 491, 290 P.2d 593 (1955)
(condition in deed providing for reversion to grantors on failure to use land for a school
was construed as limiting the condition to the lifetime of the grantors); Atkins v. Ander-
son, 139 Cal. App. 2d 918, 294 P.2d 727 (1956) (forfeiture denied when plaintiff ac-
cepted the purchase price with knowledge of violation of the restriction and at the time
of the trial the restriction had been complied with).
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longer be legitimately effected. But are the judicial tools presently
available adequate? It is argued that, by the very nature of the ques-
tions presented in litigation involving restrictions upon the use of land,
each being individual as to its factual content, legislation in this area
would be undesirable, since it would deprive the courts of their dis-
cretionaiy power in deciding the issues presented and instead substi-
tute a rigid legislative standard.
The basic inadequacy of the judicial methods presently available
is revealed in the following areas: (1) Restrictions on the use of land
by way of condition subsequent or special limitation are allowed to
remain as clouds on the title until litigated. This has a twofold effect.
It reduces the marketability of the property and it may depreciate the
value of the property to the owner as for example where the condition
burdening the property is one restricting it to residential use and the
property is no longer desirable as residential property but has a great
commercial or business value. (2) Under the present law, the holder
of a right of entry or possibility of reverter, whether the original
grantor or a successor to the interest of the grantor, continues to hold
that interest without limitation of the rule against perpetuities and
may exercise the power incident to that right years after the original
limitation was imposed notwithstanding the fact that the original in-
tention of the grantor may no longer be applicable to his successor in
interest. (3) Cities in the development of effective planning of sub-
division expansion as well as wise use of urban property are hindered
by restrictions imposed at an earlier time. (4) The courts are unduly
handicapped in the solutions available to them in adjudicating the
litigation arising from the breach of conditions and limitations imposed
by way of condition subsequent and determinable fee. At present if
a construction of a determinable fee is impressed upon the court, by
operation of law the possessory estate is determined and the absolute
fee vests in the holder of the possibility of reverter. This is so even
though no damage has been inflicted upon the holder of the possibility.
It would seem that a far better solution would enable the court to test
the enforceability of this limitation by the generally accepted standard
in equity of balancing the conveniences, awarding damages if any and
quieting the possessory holder's title; or if the limitation is still capable
of securing its original purpose enter a decree of specific performance
in favor of the holder of the possibility.
In short, assuming the restrictions to have been validly created in
the first place, the courts are at present limited to three judicial de-
vices: (1) strict construction of forfeitures and the scope of restrictive
covenants, (2) waiver and estoppel, and (3) the doctrine of changing
conditions. Although the courts have been liberal in applying these
rules other considerations ought to be available for the court's deter-
mination in reaching a decision.
Feb., 1962)
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The New York code provisions30 adopted recently afford an en-
lightened step in the right direction in the solution of these problems.3 1
One of the provisions provides for a recording of a declaration of in-
tention to preserve certain interests in lands arising from the ancient
restrictions on the use of land by way of condition subsequent and
special limitation and extinguishes such interests if a declaration of
intention is not recorded within the prescribed time.3 2 This provision
would extinguish possibilities of reverter and rights of entry held by
grantors and their successors in interest restricting the use of land upon
failure to record a declaration and thereby quiet title and eliminate a
restriction upon the use of the land.
Another of the New York code provisions codifies the common law
doctrines under which promissory conditions on the use of land are
denied enforcement or extinguished upon payment of damages. This
provision also subjects restrictions created subsequent to its enactment
by way of condition subsequent and special limitation to the same doc-
trines. The code further authorizes the court to exercise its discretion
in declaring the restrictions unenforceable "if the restrictions are of
no substantial benefit to the person seeking enforcement either because
the restriction has been accomplished or by reason of changed condi-
tion, or other cause, its purpose is not capable of enforcement or for
any other reason." 33 This provision fully incorporates the common law
doctrines applicable to the enforcement of restrictions and at the same
time confers upon the court discretion upon which to base their hold-
ing. This would enable the courts to rely on other factors beyond the
traditional area of changing conditions and waiver in weighing the
equities of the case as the merits would indicate, without the necessity
of adhering to an artificial standard and stretching the meaning of
these doctrines in order to obtain the desired results. This provision
would meet the objection of those who oppose legislation in this area
on the basis that it would deprive the court of its discretion in deciding
each case on the merits. It would in fact give the court a greater lati-
tude of discretion than it already has.
A third provision empowers the court to apply the tests of enforce-
ability, cited above in the other code provisions, in determining the
means of relief against existing restrictions on the use of land created
3o For an excellent discussion on the remedial features of the New York Code pro-
visions and considerations prompting their adoption see the report of the N.Y. Legislative
Commission, in McKinney's Session Laws of N.Y. (1958).
31 For a discussion of similar legislation enacted in other jurisdictions and full cita-
tion on law-review articles see CLARK, COVENANTS & INTEREsTs RUNNING wiTI THE LAND
197 (2d ed. 1947).
32 N.Y. REAL PRop. LAW § 345, pp. 133-36.
33 N.Y. REAL Pnop. LAw § 346, pp. 136-37.
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by special limitation or condition subsequent which unreasonably
limits the use of land. 4
Based upon a consideration of the means at present available to
the courts to declare limitations on the use of land void and unenforce-
able and the inadequacies posed by those devices, California should
adopt legislation which would enable the courts to better strike the
balance in determining which restrictions shall be deemed unenforce-
able as contrary to provisions of public policy. The New York code
affords a desirable approach.
34 N.Y. REAL PioP. LAw § 348, p. 138.
